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Abstract  
  
The Greek debt crisis opened up the policy discourse over Europe to the extent of an unprecedented extent 
of questioning of the original design of the Eurozone. Such a rethink requires an examination of how the 
European economy functions and the appropriate theoretical approach to analysing it. The purpose of this 
paper is to revisit the thinking behind the design of European Monetary Union and behind the Post 
Keynesian critique. While the mainstream response is couched in terms of addressing impediments to 
economic convergence through market forces, the Post Keynesian response focuses on the forces for 
divergence which the Eurozone framework currently exacerbates. In particular we argue that a focus on the 
forces for economic divergence and financial instability in Europe requires any monetary union to be 
supported by a system of fiscal support and a cohesive approach to bank regulation and support.  
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1. Introduction  
  
The Greek debt crisis has had one valuable consequence. The situation posed such a strong threat to the 
functioning of the Eurozone (from Grexit or from Greece remaining in the Eurozone, depending on one’s 
perspective) that longstanding questions about the viability of the original design of the Eurozone have been 
given a much more general airing in public discourse than in the past. The situation has been recognised as 
a crisis for Europe; it is now accepted that sovereign debt is not necessarily risk-free and there is uncertainty 
as to whether the structure of the Eurozone can handle the consequences. Was this a crisis which was 
bound to arise sooner or later because of problems with the structure of the Eurozone? The way in which 
questions about long-term viability of that structure are answered depends crucially on which theoretical 
perspective is employed (implicitly or explicitly) and thus how the problems with the Eurozone are 
understood. It is thus the purpose of this paper to step back from the current detailed discourse in order to 
explore the source of Europe’s crisis in the design of the Eurozone, which has provided the basis for 
heterodox critiques in the past.
1
  
Behind the different theoretical perspectives lies a view of theory itself, how far it is a technical 
matter separable from politics. The groping towards an interim resolution of the Greek debt crisis exposed 
the strong political elements in the functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), whereby it became 
more widely clear that policy ideas cannot be detached from power relations. The original theoretical basis 
for design of the Eurozone treated political matters as separable from ‘technical’ economic questions. But it 
had not addressed the increasingly pressing questions as to the rights and obligations of members of a 
currency union, and the mechanisms by which such a union deals with imbalances of political power among 
its members. As Brecher (1957: 241) noted in a different context, public policy is the outcome of a power 
struggle over competing interests. ‘In this struggle, theory often emerges as the dominant group’s instrument 
for identifying its welfare with that of the community’.   
Other crises have never pushed the Eurozone so close to the edge; what have been regarded as 
solutions in the past have had some limited success, deflecting the fundamental critiques which have 
                                                          
1 The critique is offered at a fairly general level (see further Chick and Dow, 2012). The complex particularities of financial 
arrangements in the Eurozone provide the basis for much more detailed critiques (see e.g. Bibow, 2015).  
  World Economic Review  
  
World Economic Review 6: 1-11, 2016  2  
consistently been expressed by heterodox economists. But this is no time to be complacent that these 
critiques have been validated by events. Rather the current climate provides an opportunity to spell out the 
theoretical arguments again; heterodox economists have had good reasons to criticise the design of the 
Eurozone which are much more fundamental than such procedural questions as whether it was right to 
include Greece in the Eurozone in the first place. Just as it is common in mainstream discourse to identify 
the causes of the global financial crisis in particularities such as the development of opaque structured 
products rather than anything more fundamental, there is a danger that the Greek crisis is seen in a similar 
light.   
There is a rich vein of critiques of the design of the Eurozone dating from its inception (see e.g. 
Parguez, 1999; Arestis and Sawyer, 2001). The purpose of this paper is to revisit the foundations of these 
critiques, focusing on the Post Keynesian approach, set against the foundations of the approach on which 
design of the Eurozone was based at Maastricht. We start with the importance of ontology: how the 
economic system is understood, in terms of forces for real divergence or convergence, financial instability or 
stability. We further explore the relations between the real and the financial by focusing on the operations of 
banks in Europe. These ontological positions provide the basis for the different theoretical systems which 
underpinned the design of EMU and the Post Keynesian critique. From this critique follows the proposal for a 
system of fiscal redistribution and for bank regulation suited to a heterogeneous banking sector. It is argued 
that the mainstream understandings of fiscal union and banking union are in fact very different.   
  
How the European Economy is Understood and Analysed  
  
EMU was designed on the basis of an understanding of the European economy as naturally equilibrating 
except for impediments to the working of market forces, particularly those arising from different government 
policies and institutions. EMU was to be a central element of the strategy to promote a single European 
market. A single currency was seen as contributing to the breaking down of barriers between member 
economies, allowing for the reaping of real economies of scale in production, as well as efficiency in financial 
matters (Cecchini, 1988). If goods and factors could flow freely between European economies, with reduced 
transaction costs (including exchange rate uncertainty), then Europe could compete on an equal footing with 
the US. National governments still had control of some economic levers, so efforts to harmonise policies 
were seen as a mechanism for reducing the scope for different market conditions in different member states. 
But institutions, conventions and practices continued to sustain some barriers between national economies. 
Indeed it was understood that European economies differed in terms of productivity and also financial 
structure, and these too needed to be harmonised in order for the single market to be fully realised.  
The early mainstream debates over how to proceed towards monetary union reflected two different 
views on how to harmonise productivity and financial conditions (Coffey and Presley, 1971). The 
‘monetarists’ argued that the introduction of the single currency would itself bring real convergence about, by 
enhancing factor mobility and competition within Europe. But the ‘economists’ argued that real convergence 
was required first in order for the single currency and the new centralised central banking system to 
substitute successfully for national currencies and national monetary policy. In the event the Maastricht 
Treaty required convergence as a condition for entry into EMU, but convergence with respect to financial 
indicators rather than real indicators, in the spirit of the ‘monetarist’ strategy. This was symptomatic of a more 
general emphasis on monetary factors as the focus of macroeconomic policy in EMU and inattention to real 
macroeconomic factors. It was assumed that, once real convergence had been achieved, it would be 
sustained by EMU. There would therefore no longer be a need for national policy on exchange rates to 
address any divergence in productivity performance, or for independent monetary policy.  
It was accepted that real convergence might take time. Yet EMU would mean that the valuation of 
sovereign debt denominated in euros would not reflect any remaining differences in real economic conditions 
between member countries. It was therefore crucial for market acceptability that the implications of such 
differences be minimised by a common European monetary policy which was not subverted by national fiscal 
policies. Therefore the constraints on debt and fiscal deficits which were central to the Maastricht Treaty 
were designed to address the need to avoid either default on the bonds issued by an offending member or 
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else financial support from the rest of the Eurozone (see for example European Commission, 1990: 107). 
Thus, when in fact economic conditions have diverged within the Eurozone, the strict limits on fiscal deficits 
and debt have been enforced by imposing deflation on weaker economies, introducing an overall deflationary 
bias. In some cases, of course, stronger Eurozone members (Germany and France) were allowed to violate 
the conditions in 2003. A different attitude was therefore apparently taken to the risk of default on sovereign 
debt or need for financial support on the part of different types of member state. The expectation that capital 
markets would punish member states which violated the strictures on deficits and debt did not seem to apply 
equally to all member states, just as during the recent crisis.  
This mainstream understanding of the economy which underpinned the design of EMU was based 
on an understanding that any economic divergence which might emerge in spite of a common monetary and 
fiscal policy must be the outcome of barriers to trade or to movements of factors. It was anticipated that the 
effect of asymmetric shocks on any member state would be addressed by factor movements. Harmonisation 
of and constraints on national government policies, the strengthening of European institutions, and above all 
the introduction of a single currency, would thus allow market forces to promote economic and financial 
convergence. Thus for example the Greek crisis is widely understood as the outcome of a lack of 
harmonisation by Greece with conventions and practices elsewhere in Europe. If only this harmonisation 
could be achieved, it is implied, the problem would be resolved and the Greek economy would converge with 
the rest of Europe.  
This understanding of economies as naturally equilibrating, but subject to constraints on free market 
forces, supports the use of general equilibrium macroeconomic models. Indeed the volume representing 
preparatory research on EMU (European Commission, 1990) is a clear illustration that this was the 
methodological and theoretical approach on which EMU was based. Crucially, this approach presumes the 
outcome of convergence (subject to constraints).
2
   
The dominant theory employed was optimal currency area theory in the particular form developed 
by Mundell (1961), i.e. emphasising labour and capital mobility (see also McKinnon, 1963). Other versions of 
optimal currency theory had offered different, potentially conflicting, versions. Some contributors specified 
real economic convergence as a precondition for monetary union (specifying conditions in terms of how far 
economies had a shared susceptibility to shocks and/or coincidence of economic cycles for example), while 
others specified capacity to address imbalances from asymmetric shocks by means of fiscal transfers, for 
example.
3
 But it is telling that Mundell’s view dominated, reflecting the general equilibrium theoretical 
perspective whereby factor mobility was seen as allowing market forces to address any real imbalances 
without any need for further government intervention.   
In other words, while optimal currency area theory allowed for the possible emergence of short-term  
productivity differences, an optimal currency area was one where factors were sufficiently mobile to promote 
convergence. (Factors would move until their returns were again equalised.) Further the Classical dichotomy 
held – inflation was a monetary phenomenon and, as was evident from the European Commission collection 
of academic research in the run-up to EMU (European Commission, 1990), only minimal attention was paid 
to the banking sector, other than as a passive conduit of capital flows. Typical of mainstream 
macroeconomics before the crisis, the possibility of financial instability was not contemplated; even more 
than real economies, the financial sector could be assumed to equilibrate.   
Optimal currency area theory had aimed to identify groups of national economies which satisfied the 
conditions (e.g. a high degree of factor mobility) for being able to deal with balance of payments problems 
without recourse to exchange rate adjustment. The exemplar was those national economies which 
apparently coped with regional imbalances without regional exchange rates or regional monetary policy. 
Within national economies, any payments imbalances before full adjustment occurs were seen to be 
resolved by the payments settlement system, through the banks’ balances with the central bank. Similarly, 
within EMU, while some imbalances on the sum of the current and capital accounts of member states would 
emerge, they would be addressed in the short run by financial imbalances within the currency area (through 
                                                          
2 Also the analysis is conducted at a highly aggregated level (with monetary policy represented by the target rate of inflation, for 
example).  
3 See further Ishiyama (1975) for a review and Eichengreen (1993) for an updated review in light of the Maastricht Treaty.  
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the payments system) until real adjustment occurred. For EMU, the Trans-European Automated Real-time 
Gross settlement Express Transfer (TARGET) system, currently operating in its second-generation form as 
TARGET2, was set up to  provide a level playing field for effecting payments settlements across the 
Eurozone. The system was seen as a precondition for the effective conduct of ECB monetary policy as well 
as the further promotion of financial integration. It was expected that the imbalances within the system would 
be small and short-lived.    
In fact the TARGET2 transfers have become very substantial since the onset of crisis, indicating 
persistent imbalances, particularly between Germany’s credit position and the debit positions of peripheral 
member states, notably Greece and Ireland (Bibow, 2015: 71). There is a lively literature exploring the causal 
mechanisms behind these imbalances, notably as to whether or not they reflect balance-of-payments 
imbalances or simply a diversion of flows from the capital account to TARGET2 (see e.g. Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser, 2012 and Whelan, 2013).  
Some commentators see the particular design of the TARGET system within the overall system of 
European monetary policy as simply distorting the way in which normal market forces naturally bring about 
adjustment to payments imbalances, impeding convergence. Others see the wider institutional framework of 
the Eurozone as being far too constrained to prevent divergence. According to this latter view, the TARGET2 
imbalances in fact reflect the weakness of the institutional structures and policy tools in the Eurozone. The 
difficulties for governments in meeting deficit limits when faced with a national banking crisis have been 
compounded by the strictures on independent national central banks and the ECB with respect to directly 
financing governments. Even ECB  financial support for banks has come up against the problem of the 
requirement for high-quality collateral just when public sector debt came to be seen as potentially risky (see 
e.g. Lavoie 2015b).   
The Eurozone is accordingly understood from a heterodox perspective as a collection of 
economies, each of which was potentially unstable as an independent nation, but where the scope for 
collective instability has been reinforced by the institutional structures and practices of the Eurozone. A 
crucial factor has been the primacy given to money as the putative cause of inflation and capital markets as 
the key to promoting adjustment to payments imbalances. Fiscal policy has explicitly been constrained, 
treated as separable from (centralised) monetary policy, while unemployment has been seen as an issue 
only as a bi-product of the austerity policies required to enforce fiscal controls and achieve the inflation target 
rather than as a key policy concern.  
The general equilibrium theoretical approach relies heavily on the mechanism of monetary flows. If  
a nation has a current account deficit and cannot attract sufficient capital to finance it, then the consequent 
outflow of funds will reduce local factor prices, restoring payments equilibrium (potentially on both accounts). 
The role of the banking system in effecting these flows is to intermediate, reducing loans when deposits 
decrease through a payments deficit and vice versa in the case of a surplus. This tight relationship may be 
mitigated by internal flows within a multinational bank, seen as transferring deposit-funded credit from one 
economy to another, but only when warranted by relatively high expected returns in the economy attracting 
such an inflow, in line with the general expected direction of capital flows.   
But from a Post Keynesian perspective the process is quite different. The money supply is seen as 
being endogenously determined by the market for credit, albeit influenced by the central bank. In the 
absence of a negative relation between the return on capital and the interest rate, member countries 
experiencing a relative decline in productivity will experience not only a deterioration on the current account 
but may also experience a deterioration on the capital account as investment prospects weaken, which could 
be compounded by a reduced willingness of local banks to extend credit, and increased liquidity preference 
is satisfied by capital outflows. Such economies are forced therefore to adjust by introducing fiscal austerity; 
until (and if) this succeeds in improving the current account, the payments gap must be filled by borrowing. 
The ECB quantitative easing program has attempted to ease borrowing conditions. But the increased 
liquidity has not eased conditions in the real economy since banks have proved to be unwilling to accept the 
credit risk they perceive (thus increasing credit risk) and have preferred to exercise a high level of liquidity 
preference.  
  World Economic Review  
  
World Economic Review 6: 1-11, 2016  5  
When he proposed an international central bank, issuing an international currency, Keynes 
envisaged a central payments settlement mechanism which would allow for temporary debit and credit 
balances. Cesarrato (2013) and Lavoie (2015a) discuss the extent to which the TARGET system accords 
with the Keynes plan. A critical difference is Keynes’s insistence on measures to ensure that surplus 
countries not only bore some of the burden of adjustment but would actually have to take the initiative in 
adjustment. This would remove the normal deflationary bias of payments adjustment. Although the ECB 
deposit facility currently attracts a marginally negative rate, this is clearly not acting as an effective incentive 
for surplus countries to adjust. An effective penalty rate is required. In the meantime the purported 
connection of general equilibrium theory between money injections and aggregate demand have not 
materialised because of high liquidity preference and weak effective demand.  
The other possible parallel is with a national payments system. Lavoie (2015a: 10) points out that 
current account imbalances between regions within any member country are not seen as a problem (in 
making the point that they should not be a problem between Eurozone members either). Regional 
economies are generally given national fiscal support, among other factors within a national political and 
institutional structure promoting convergence. Further temporary imbalances can be handled within national 
branch banks or the interbank market, supported by the liquidity provision of the national central bank 
designed to sustain the official rate. There is no currency value or (generally) valuation of regional 
government debt by which a crisis could be identified.   
But the Post Keynesian approach to regional finance has suggested that regional economies do 
face hidden balance of payments problems (Dow, 1986). Accounts are not kept on a regional basis, 
particularly with respect to capital flows, but changing regional patterns of economic performance still have 
consequences. It is often assumed that any resulting imbalances are offset on the capital account such that 
crisis-level financial constraints do not arise. But if capital inflows are insufficient to finance current account 
outflows (e.g. businesses experiencing a decline in demand unable to borrow to finance production, far less 
investment), there is no option but to accept adjustment in the form of reduced regional employment and 
income and/or increased labour out-migration. Indeed, far from offsetting current account imbalances, the 
capital account may add to them; destabilising real adjustment may discourage capital inflows even further. 
Bank credit is endogenous, but the regional supply depends on banks’ assessment of regional credit risk as 
well as the banks’ general level of liquidity preference.  
This approach draws on the Keynesian theories of effective demand and liquidity preference and 
combines these with Myrdal’s theory of cumulative causation, emphasising the interdependence of the real 
and the financial. It has been applied to a theory of regional development by Chick and Dow (1988) and 
Rodriguez Fuentes (1998).
4
 Further, Bibow (2010), Chick (2000), Dow (1993; 1998) and Dow and Rodriguez 
Fuentes (2003) have applied the Post Keynesian approach to the European Union. Rather than the typical 
mainstream presumption that flows between regional banks and within national banks serve to promote 
regional convergence, these examples of Post Keynesian analysis of the regional pattern of credit creation 
and liquidity preference indicate that these flows can be an additional force for divergence.   
This regional theory of banking rests on the Keynesian/Minskyan theory, not only of economic 
instability, but also financial instability. Credit supply is determined by bank assessment of lenders’ risk and 
expected returns, while credit demand is determined by borrowers’ assessment of their own risk and 
expected returns. The more credit supply is concentrated in centralised institutions remote from borrowers’ 
experience, the weaker the knowledge base (Porteous, 1995). The outcome is greater instability in credit 
supply, depending on ill-informed expectations. Given the experience of economic divergence and therefore 
financial vulnerability, investment planning (and thus demand for credit) in weaker regions is discouraged 
and high liquidity preference encouraged. Not only are financial systems in general vulnerable to instability, 
but the instability tends to be exaggerated in peripheral regions.
5
 This process contributes to, as well as 
feeds on, the forces for real economic divergence.   
                                                          
4 Applications of the theory include Dow (1992) with respect to Scotland, Chick, Dow and Rodriguez Fuentes (2013) with respect to 
Spanish regions, Dow, Montagnoli and Napolitano (2012) with respect to Italy, and Amado (1997) and Crocco et al. (2014) with 
respect to Brazil; see also other publications arising from the Lente project at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in Brazil  
5 As a result, national monetary policy has differential effects on regional economies (Rodriguez Fuentes, 2006).  
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From a Post Keynesian/institutionalist perspective, each regional economy is understood to be 
conditioned by its own history and institutions in a way which cannot readily be altered; this understanding 
applies with much greater force to national economies. Rather than constraints, these factors have more 
often than not lent stability and coherence to national economies. Thus for example, while national banks 
may find themselves constrained in terms of funding compared to large international banks, they have 
superior knowledge of the credit-worthiness of local borrowers and a tendency to finance investment by local 
firms. Myrdal (1972) concluded that, on balance, the cumulative forces for convergence would tend to 
outweigh those for divergence within national boundaries. This judgement is reinforced by the common fiscal 
framework within a national economy.   
But in an international context Myrdal concluded that the balance of forces was tipped towards 
divergence. Applying his analysis to the opening up of competition between members of the EU with the 
development of the single market, some economies fared better than others. Factor flows induced by these 
differences and encouraged by the single market are more likely to be disequilibrating than equilibrating. It is 
the more skilled workers who leave relatively declining economies first, further reducing factor returns. 
Similarly, just as within national boundaries, capital flight from relatively declining economies, combined with 
relatively high liquidity preference there, increases the perception of high risk attached to any new credit, 
thus discouraging its supply.
6
 The more factor mobility is encouraged, e.g. by the single European banking 
licence introduced in 1992, the more scope there is for the forces for divergence to operate. The increased 
concentration in the banking sector (following the initial flurry of competition) added to these forces by 
centralising bank credit decision-making, reducing the knowledge base on which loans could be extended in 
remoter parts of Europe.   
The strong implication of this analysis is that, far from promoting real economic convergence among 
European economies, the efforts to open up the European market, particularly with a single currency, in fact 
added power to the forces for divergence, while removing mechanisms for counteracting these tendencies. 
Marelli and Signorelli (2015) provide evidence which supports this conclusion.  
  
Policy Implications  
  
The reason for exploring the basis of the different understandings of the European economy and their 
associated analytical approaches is that they lead to different understandings of the Eurozone’s current 
problems and therefore different policy solutions to those problems. On the surface there appears to have 
been one problem with the Eurozone: Greece has been in danger of defaulting on its debt and/or of seeing 
the only option as being to leave the Eurozone. Either outcome would be highly damaging for the Eurozone, 
given the presumptions that the Maastricht criteria would eliminate the possibility of default and that the 
establishment of the single currency was irreversible. Greece’s problems are however just a more extreme 
version of problems experienced elsewhere in the Eurozone’s periphery. In particular the recent fiscal 
problems of several peripheral European economies arose from the need to shore up weak banks and the 
consequent need for financial support at the price of austerity policies. The solutions being aired to address 
these problems were fiscal union and banking union, with discussion also of the ECB acting as a lender of 
last resort.
7
   
Each of these policy responses actually means something very different depending on theoretical 
approach and ontological foundation. Fiscal union from a mainstream perspective means a much more strict 
enforcement of the Maastricht rules on debt and deficits, as was required for example for Spain and Ireland. 
While Greece’s fiscal problems similarly arose primarily from the need to support its banks, the mainstream 
interpretation of the causes of the Greek crisis, and therefore the basis for the solution, is that information 
had been concealed by previous Greek governments, that Greek institutions and practices had not 
                                                          
6 A single European monetary policy can thus be expected to have differential effects across member states (Dow and Rodriguez 
Fuentes, 2003).  
7 There is also active discussion of a capital market union whose features would promote common institutions, practices and 
procedures throughout the Eurozone, encouraging further competition and furthering the process of securitisation which was an 
important driver of the crisis (Chick, 2008).  
  World Economic Review  
  
World Economic Review 6: 1-11, 2016  7  
harmonised sufficiently with the rest of Europe, and that the standard mechanism for ensuring that Greece 
met the Maastricht restrictions on the fiscal deficit (austerity) was being resisted.   
European banking union has been pursued both for consolidating the single currency and for 
‘rebooting’ the euro area banking system (Bibow, 2015: 75-6). A particular motivation is to prevent 
recurrence of the fiscal cost of bank support, which makes it difficult for member governments to satisfy the 
Maastricht rules on deficits and debt. Bank failure would instead be dealt with at a European level, with 
‘bailing in’ designed to protect the fiscal finances. Further, by thus detaching banks from national fiscal 
positions, the idea is that their uniform treatment would ensure a common cost of funding credit across 
Europe, thus ensuring uniform availability of credit to businesses in all member countries (European 
Commission 2014: 4). As with the fiscal union, banking union would involve a strict enforcement of common 
rules: prudential rules for European banks, a common supervisory framework and mechanisms for dealing 
with bank failures.
8
 The primary prudential focus is to be on capital ratios, while resolution of bank failures is 
to impose the costs on shareholders and bondholders rather than on the state.   
It is of critical importance that the thinking behind the conceptualisation of banking union reflects the 
mainstream view that bank failures can be regarded as separable incidents, a microeconomic problem rather 
than a systemic macroeconomic problem. Without what are regarded as distortions, such as state support for 
banks, it is assumed that market forces within a common market will ensure stability. Since market forces 
operate by competition whereby there are inevitably going to be losers from time to time, the issue 
addressed by banking union is how to minimise the fall-out (in fiscal cost and in contagion of expectations) of 
individual cases of bank failure. The aim therefore is to do away completely with the role of central banks as 
lenders of last resort to commercial banks. There is to be no ‘fiscal backstop’ (Bibow, 2015: 86-90). Rather 
the lender-of-last-resort proposal from the mainstream perspective refers to the possibility of the European 
Central Bank lending to Eurozone governments, something which was long resisted on the grounds that this 
would violate the Maastricht prohibition on central bank monetisation of deficits. Overall then the mainstream 
policy agenda follows from a theoretical framework which still understands market forces as equilibrating as 
long as they are not impeded by money creation resulting from excessive fiscal deficits or other market 
‘distortions’. If these deficits arise from bank support, then banks need to be exposed more to market forces 
(subject to centrally-established prudential requirements).   
The Post Keynesian stance reflects the fact that regional balance of payments problems within 
economies rarely spark crises (even if they promote regional divergence) because of fiscal support at the 
national level, a national system of bank regulation and bank practices, and a lender-of-last-resort facility for 
all national and regional banks at the national central bank. Post Keynesian theory therefore indicates policy 
proposals which, like the mainstream approach, also involves fiscal union, banking union and a lender-of-
last-resort facility. But in each case the meaning is very different from the mainstream proposals. The 
underlying Post Keynesian view is that there are powerful forces for divergence within Europe. The 
mechanisms promoting divergence have been given added force by EMU, since the Maastricht Treaty 
removed the normal policy tools for addressing the resulting productivity and payments imbalances. A single 
external value of the currency and a single official interest rate cannot accommodate differing economic 
conditions in different member states, where these differences are exacerbated by the increased openness 
of factor and goods markets promoted by the EU.   
The Delors proposal (Committee for the Study of EMU, 1989) for a system of fiscal transfers 
between European nations was rejected. Yet this is how nation states address imbalances within their own 
boundaries. Even if regional policy has been eroded in many countries, reflecting the growing influence of 
market-oriented politics, the automatic fiscal stabilisers still serve to reduce regional disparities (Kaldor, 
1970). For Post Keynesians, what is required is a sharing of revenues in order to counter the forces and 
effects of economic divergence, something which is normal within federal forms of economic and political 
union. This is a fiscal union in the spirit of cooperation (recognising that, as in a federal state, the direction of 
transfer changes as the fortunes of member states may change). This is very different from fiscal union as 
the attempted enforcement of fiscal rules which cannot succeed. Not only do governments not have control 
                                                          
8 Little progress has been made on a common system of deposit insurance (see Bibow, 2015: 86, 90).  
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over their net deficits (Chick and Pettifor, with Tily, 2010), but even if they could be successful in controlling 
deficits, austerity policies would simply exacerbate forces for divergence.   
Second, the banking sector is key, because credit creation and allocation are key drivers of the 
European economy, as well as potential sources of financial instability. While the mainstream policy for 
banking is to enhance the capacity for market forces to ensure efficient allocation of financial resources and 
financial stability, minimising state-led ‘distortions’, the Post Keynesian policy is to focus on the positive role 
for the state in partnership with the banking sector. It is argued that free competition in banking leads to 
concentration, diverting credit creation from productive activity towards speculation in centralised asset 
markets and from peripheral economies to large corporations located in the Centre. The state therefore has 
an important role in counteracting these tendencies. This role can extend from setting up state-run financial 
institutions tasked with extending credit to activities and regions ill-served by large international banks, to 
providing support for small local financial institutions. Thus for example Bibow (2014) proposes a Euro 
Treasury. Further, when central banks inject liquidity into the system to satisfy liquidity preference in the 
wake of the crisis, the conduit can be expenditure in, or credit to, sectors particularly disadvantaged by the 
crisis, as in the proposals for ‘people’s quantitative easing’. According to this view of the essential nature of 
the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, central banks are lender of first resort to governments.  
But the state equally has a fundamental role to play in ensuring the stability of the financial system. 
The latest financial crisis was spurred on by the deregulation of the financial sector since the 1970s (Chick, 
2008). This process was a product of mainstream presumption of convergence as the normal state of the 
(unconstrained) world. While financial instability is the norm, the freeing up of the financial sector from the 
1970s provided particular aggravation, whereby financial fragility was stoked up during the long period of the 
‘great moderation’. Far from bank vulnerability occurring on an isolated basis, the norm is for bank 
vulnerability to be systemic, rendering the ‘bail-in’ solution unsustainable (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2014).  
While the mainstream response is to try to minimise the state’s involvement in banking, focusing on the 
possibility of individual bank failure, the Post Keynesian response is to restore the traditional cooperative 
relationship between the state and banks. This relationship involved the banks enjoying lender-of-last-resort 
support from the state (and their consequent ability to attract short-term deposits with a high redeposit ratio) 
in return for submission to regulation and supervision to ensure the safety of those deposits (Dow, 2012). 
The important lender-of-last-resort function thus refers to the banks rather than government.   
A European banking union from this perspective therefore involves a Europe-wide commitment to 
support retail banking in exchange for submission to regulation and supervision to ensure prudence. But 
there are dangers inherent in applying this policy at a European level. Historical relationships between state, 
banks and the public are important, and differ as between European economies (see e.g. Chick and Dow, 
1997). Ultimately, the success of a monetary system derives from trust, which is a social phenomenon based 
on experience mediated through culture rather than calculative rationality. It would require careful and time-
consuming development to arrive at a relationship between state, banks and public which would engender 
trust across Europe. In the meantime, the priority for European banking union is to facilitate the capacity of 
national authorities to act as lenders of last resort to their home banks. In turn this requires a recognition of 
the need for fiscal support, just one reflection of the inevitable interrelationships between monetary policy 
and fiscal policy which the Maastricht system tried to suppress.  
  
Concluding Reflections  
  
This discussion of the role of central banks illustrates well differences in viewpoint as to the nature of theory 
and policy advice. We have discussed the implications of ontological differences for theory and policy with 
respect to Europe. But there are implications too for how theory itself is regarded. In particular the 
mainstream closed-system approach encourages a view of theory and policy as being purely technical 
matters. The open-system Post Keynesian approach by contrast considers economic relations as bound up 
in social, political and ethical relations. Thus, for example, while trust for mainstream economists is a form of 
rational optimising behaviour, for Post Keynesians it involves history, sociology and politics in a complex 
way.   
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Certainly the mainstream analysis has paid considerable attention to institutional developments as 
an integral element of EMU. But these institutions have been understood as implementers of technical 
policies: controlling the European money supply according to an inflation target, controlling national fiscal 
policy, and more generally promoting institutional and policy uniformity across Europe. Yet the outcome has 
been far from what was anticipated. The economic divergence which has resulted has meant a very uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits, without any offsetting mechanisms other than those prompted by crisis 
situations. The response to crisis has clearly been political, surrounded by a range of stances as to what 
constitutes the rights and responsibilities involved in membership of a currency union. A monetary union 
without a fiscal union in the Post Keynesian sense has been proven to be unworkable, with disastrous 
consequences. A monetary union designed without reference to the detailed working of all aspects of the 
European banking sector has allowed the mainstream discourse to reject the idea of state support for 
banking, from which Post Keynesian theory would also predict disastrous consequences.     
It has been argued here that the design and implementation of EMU was based on a theoretical 
structure which in effect assumed convergence as the default equilibrium position. Institutions and practices 
were required to limit impediments to real convergence, emphasising money and finance rather than real 
production. Given the crisis in Europe, the conclusion is inevitable that the cause must be that these 
institutions and practices were not fit for purpose and require reform to give more rein to market forces.   
The heterodox critique is based on an understanding that economies are inevitably potentially 
unstable, such that institutions and practices are required to promote stability, recognising the inherent 
interdependence of the real and the financial in the economy and in government. It is on this basis that a 
more constructive (rather than preventative) approach is taken to the role of the state in Europe in terms of 
fiscal union and banking union, with the ECB acting as lender of first resort to governments and lender of last 
resort to banks.  
To the extent that there is recognition that the design of the Eurozone is fundamentally flawed, there 
may be a political will to revisit Maastricht. If the mainstream theory’s foundational belief in market 
convergence is seen to be challenged by events, then there is a political case for exploring an alternative 
theoretical framework based on alternative foundations. It is hard, given the experience in the European 
economy since the global financial crisis took hold in 2008, for any economist to deny that financial and 
economic instability can persist, and that monetary and fiscal rules may not be sufficient to address it. 
Mainstream thinking may have absorbed some of these real developments. Yet we have shown here that the 
fundamental mainstream understanding of economies as normally equilibrating unless impeded by market 
imperfections persists in the type of policy solutions being developed in the Eurozone. Until the shortcomings 
in that understanding are fully grasped, any attempt to revise the Maastricht principles will inevitably fall 
short.  
  
  
References  
Amado, A (1997) Disparate Regional Development in Brazil. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Arestis, P and Sawyer, M (2001) ‘Will the Euro Bring Economic Crisis to Europe?’, Levy Institute Working 
Paper no. 322.   
Avgouleas, A and Goodhart, C A E (2014) ‘A critical evaluation of bail-in as a bank recapitalization 
mechanism’, International Macroeconomics Discussion Paper Series no. 10065, London, CEPR.   
Bibow, J (2010) Keynes on Monetary Policy, Finance and Uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Bibow, J (2014) ‘The Euro Treasury Plan’, Levy Institute Public Policy Brief no. 135, August.  
Bibow, (2015) ‘The euro’s savior? Assessing the ECB’s crisis management performance and potential for 
crisis resolution’, IMK Study 42, June.   
Brecher, I (1957) Monetary and Fiscal Thought and Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
  World Economic Review  
  
World Economic Review 6: 1-11, 2016  10  
Cecchini, P (1988) Report: The European Challenge: 1992 The Benefits of a Single Market, Brussels:  
Commission of the European Communities SEC (88) 524 final. http://aei.pitt.edu/3813/1/3813.pdf  
 
Cesaratto, S (2013) ‘The Implications of TARGET2 in the European Balance of Payments Crisis and 
Beyond’, European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention 10(3): 359–82.  
Chick, V (2000) ‘The regions and small businesses in bankers’ Europe’, in J. Toporowski (ed.), Political 
Economy and the New Capitalism: Essays in Memory of Sam Aaronovitch. London: Routledge.   
Chick, V (2008) ‘Could the crisis at Northern Rock have been predicted?: An evolutionary approach’, 
Contributions to Political Economy 27: 115-24.  
Chick, V and Dow, S C (1988) ‘A Post Keynesian perspective on banking and regional development’, in P 
Arestis (ed), Post Keynesian Monetary Economics. Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar.  
Chick, V and Dow, S C (1997) ‘Competition and Integration in European banking’, in A Cohen, H Hagemann 
and J Smithin (eds), Money, Financial Institutions and Macroeconomics. Boston: Kluwer.  
Chick, V and Dow, S C (2012) ‘On Causes and Outcomes of the European Crisis: Ideas, Institutions and  
Reality’, Contributions to Political Economy, 31 (1): 51-66.Chick, V, Dow, S C and Rodriguez Fuentes, C J 
(2013) ‘Good Banks and Bad Banks, Centralised Banks and Local Banks and Economic Growth’, 
Ekonomiaz, 84(3): 110-27.  
Chick, V and Pettifor, A, with Tily, G (2010) The Economic Consequences of Mr Osborne: Fiscal 
Consolidation: Lessons from a century of UK macroeconomic statistics. London: Prime. 
https://static.squarespace.com/static/541ff5f5e4b02b7c37f31ed6/t/54abf084e4b0e845494bcd66/142055437 
2466/The+Economic+Consequences+of+Mr+Osbourne+-+Final.pdf, accessed 19 August 2015.  
Coffey, P and Presley, J R (1971) European Monetary Integration. London: Macmillan.  
Committee for the Study of EMU (1989) ‘Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European 
Community’ (The Delors Report). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.  
Crocco, M, Faria-Silva F, Paulo-Rezende L and Rodriguez-Fuentes, C J (2014) ‘Banks and Regional 
Development: An Empirical Analysis on the Determinants of Credit Availability in Brazilian Regions’, Regional 
Studies 48(5): 883-95.  
Dow, S C (1986) ‘The Capital Account and Regional Balance of Payments Problems’, Urban Studies, 23(2): 
173-84.  
Dow, S C (1992) ‘The Regional Financial Sector: A Scottish Case Study’, Regional Studies 26(7): 619-31.  
Dow, S C (1993) ‘European Monetary Integration and the Distribution of Credit Availability’, in S Corbridge, R 
Martin and N Thrift (eds), Money, Power and Space, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Dow, S C (1998) ‘Financial Structure and the Economic Performance of Peripheral Economies: the Case of 
Europe’, in S Hill and B Morgan (eds), Inward Investment, Business Finance and Regional Development. 
London: Macmillan, pp. 170-85.  
Dow, S C (2012) ‘What are Banks and Bank Regulation For? A Consideration of the Foundations for 
Reform', European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, 9 (1): 39-56.  
Dow, S C, Montagnoli, A and Napolitano, O (2012), ‘Interest Rates and Convergence Across Italian Regions’, 
Regional Studies, 46 (7): 893-905.  
Dow, S C and Rodriguez Fuentes, C (2003) 'EMU and the regional impact of monetary policy', Regional 
Studies 37 (9): 969-80.  
Draghi, M (2014) ‘A consistent strategy for a sustained recovery’, Lecture, Paris, 25 March, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140325.en.html   
Eichengreen B (1993) ‘European Monetary Unification’, Journal of Economic Literature 31(3): 1321-57.  
  World Economic Review  
  
World Economic Review 6: 1-11, 2016  11  
European Commission (1990) ‘One Market, One money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of 
Forming an Economic and Monetary Union’, European Economy, 44 (October).  
European Commission (2014) ‘Banking union: restoring financial stability in the Eurozone’, Memorandum, 
Brussels, 15 April.  
Ishiyama, Y (1975) ‘The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: A Survey’, IMF Staff Papers 22(2): 344-83.  
Kaldor, N (1970) ‘The case for regional policies’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 17(3): 337–48.  
Lavoie, M (2015a) ‘The Eurozone: Similarities to and Differences from Keynes’s Plan’, International Journal 
of Political Economy 44: 3–17,  
Lavoie, M (2015b) ‘The Eurozone Crisis: A Balance-of-Payments Problem or a Crisis Due to a Flawed 
Monetary Design? A Reply to Sergio Cesaratto’, International Journal of Political Economy 44: 157–160.  
Marelli, E and Signorelli, M (2015) ‘The euro, long-run convergence and the impact of the crises’, WEA 
European Crisis online conference, available at  
http://europeancrisis2015.weaconferences.net/papers/theeuro-long-run-convergence-and-the-impact-of-the-
crises/ [accessed 15 October 2015].  
McKinnon, R (1963) ‘Optimum Currency Areas’, American Economic Review 53(4): 717-25.  
Mundell, R A (1961) ‘A theory of optimal currency areas’, American Economic Review, 51: 657-65.  
Myrdal, G (1972) Economic theory and Under-Developed Regions. London: Duckworth.  
Parguez, A (1999) ‘The Expected Failure of the European Economic and Monetary Union: A False Money 
against the Real Economy’, Eastern Economic Journal 25(91): 63–76.  
Porteous, D J (1995) The Geography of Finance. Aldershot: Avebury.  
Rodriguez Fuentes, C J (1998) ‘Credit availability and regional development’, Papers in Regional Science 
77(1): 63-75.  
Rodriguez Fuentes, C J (2006) Regional Monetary Policy. London: Routledge.  
Sinn, H-W and Wollmershaeuser (2012) ‘TARGET loans, current account balances and capital flows’, 
International Tax and Public Finance 19(4): 468-508.  
Whelan, K (2013) ‘TARGET2 and Central Bank Balance Sheets’, University College Dublin mimeo, March 
17, available at http://www.karlwhelan.com/Papers/T2Paper-March2013.pdf [accessed 15 October 2015].  
  
  
Author contact: s.c.dow@stir.ac.uk  
  
___________________________   
SUGGESTED CITATION:  
Dow, Sheila C. (2016) “Ontology and Theory for a Redesign of European Monetary Union” World Economic Review, 6,  
pp. 1-11.  
